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SADRA SADRADDINI AND CALIN BELTA
Abstract. Model predictive control (MPC) is a popular strategy for urban
traffic management that is able to incorporate physical and user defined con-
straints. However, the current MPC methods rely on finite horizon predictions
that are unable to guarantee desirable behaviors over long periods of time. In
this paper we design an MPC strategy that is guaranteed to keep the evolution
of a network in a desirable yet arbitrary -safe- set, while optimizing a finite
horizon cost function. Our approach relies on finding a robust controlled in-
variant set inside the safe set that provides an appropriate terminal constraint
for the MPC optimization problem. An illustrative example is included.
1. Introduction
Traffic congestion is a major problem in many cities worldwide. In recent
decades, many methods for more efficient usage of existing physical infrastruc-
ture have been proposed including new strategies specialized for controlling traffic
lights in an urban network [19]. With the advent of new sensing technologies and
improvements in online computation capabilities, traffic responsive strategies are
gaining more popularity.
Model predictive control (MPC) is a powerful framework for coordinating urban
traffic lights that relies on online optimization while accounting for various con-
straints in the system [15, 12, 18]. However, MPC is known to exhibit “myopic”
behavior that is a result of limited horizon planning. For instance, an MPC traffic
light control strategy may lead a network to a state in which undesirable behaviors
such as gridlock, spill-back and heavy congestion become inevitable for any future
control action. A tempting resolution is elongating the prediction horizon which is
often impractical from computational perspective. Some control strategies [18, 6, 7]
have proposed enhancing the control architecture with additional layers that try to
detect and avoid undesirable behaviors such as spill-back. However, these methods
largely rely on heuristics rather than formal and verifiable measures.
MPC closed-loop strategies that are guaranteed to satisfy a set of constraints
are studied extensively in the control theory literature [17]. Using set invariance
theories [5] and terminal constraints [14], MPC strategies have been developed
that are able to address stability issues while restricting the system trajectory to
a convex safe set. However, applying similar methods to urban traffic models is
impractical if not impossible due to the complexity of the constraints, controls and
uncertainties. Furthermore, a critical bottleneck in the set invariance theories is
the inability to deal with non-convex safe sets. Few results exist on computation of
non-convex invariant safe sets for linear systems [10] [20] [21]. Such models are not
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sufficient for traffic networks, which have to take into consideration finite capacity
roads, discrete controls (traffic lights), uncertain exogenous inputs (vehicular arrival
rates) and non-convex safe sets that are able to specify desirable behaviors such as
avoidance of spill-backs and gridlocks. Furthermore, there exist no results on MPC
control of such traffic models from rich, temporal logic [1] specifications that are
guaranteed to enforce the satisfaction of the specification over long periods of time.
In this paper, we wish to design an MPC strategy that is guaranteed to con-
fine the evolution of an urban traffic network to a user-defined (non-convex) “safe”
set. Inspired by recent advances in formal methods approaches to control theory,
we propose a new method to overcome the mentioned issues, which is based on
abstracting the network system model to a finite state system. Finite state rep-
resentations of urban traffic networks have been recently investigated in [8, 9]. In
a finite system, we can easily solve a “safety game” [22]. We prove that the safe
invariant set found in the finite representation corresponds to a robust controlled
invariant set in the original system that can be used as a terminal constraint for the
MPC optimization problem. We are thus able to guarantee that the evolution of
the system remains in the safe set, while planning ahead for optimality. Similar to
works in [15, 13], we formulate the MPC optimization problem as a mixed integer
linear programming (MILP) problem. We also argue that now being able to use
small prediction horizons, we also can rely on full enumeration of possible controls
to find the best future control plan instead of solving a possibly large MILP.
The network model and finite abstraction section of this work is almost identical
to the work in [9]. However, there are clear differences between the control strate-
gies. The authors in [9] find a control strategy that satisfies a linear temporal logic
(LTL) specification directly from solving a Rabin game [23] on a finite state graph,
without any attempt to consider optimality. However, we find an optimization
based control strategy in the original continuous system subject to the constraints
we find in the abstract finite state system. While LTL control in a traffic network
typically requires the user to rigorously specify the desired behavior of each road
and intersection, MPC naturally selects a (sub)optimal policy in the absence of
user-defined constraints. We also discuss that the methods in this paper can be ex-
tended to safety specifications described by bounded time temporal logic formulas
such as signal temporal logic (STL) at the expense of higher computational burden.
2. Traffic Network Model
The urban traffic network model used in this paper is adopted from the discrete-
time fluid-like flow model in [9]. The network consists of a set of links denoted by
L and a set of intersections denoted by V. Each l ∈ L is a oneway link from tail
intersection τ(l) ∈ V ∪∅ toward head intersection η(l) ∈ V. The links that flow out
of the network are not explicitly modeled. For each link l, the set of downstream
links is defined as:
(1) Ldownl := {k ∈ L : τ(k) = η(l)} .
Similarly, the set of upstream links is:
(2) Lupl := {i ∈ L : η(i) = τ(l)} ,
and the set of adjacent links is:
(3) Ladjl := {j ∈ L : τ(j) = τ(l)} .
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Figure 1. Links local to link l
Links in Llocall := {Lupl ∪Ldownl ∪Ladjl } are local to l. A graphical illustration of the
terminologies for a local network is shown in Fig. 1. The number of vehicles on link
l at time t ∈ Z≥0 is denoted by xl[t] ∈ [0, xcapl ], where xcapl is the capacity of link l.
The network state at time t is the vector representation x[t] = {xl}l∈L ∈ X ⊂ Rn
where n = |L| is the number of links and
(4) X =
∏
l∈L
[0, xcapl ].
The vehicular flow of link l at time t is controlled by a binary decision denoted
by ul[t] ∈ {0, 1}, where values 0 and 1 represent the red and green traffic lights,
respectively. The control decision combining all traffic lights at time t is u[t] =
{ul}l∈L ∈ U ⊂ {0, 1}n, where U is the set of admissible combinations of traffic
lights, which is defined with respect to the traffic conventions. For instance, the
green/green traffic light combination for two perpendicular links l1 and l2 that have
a common head intersection is excluded by adding the constraint ul1 [t] +ul2 [t] ≤ 1,
or ul1 [t] + ul2 [t] = 1. In the latter case, the red/red combination is also disallowed.
Note that the set U is finite.
Now we describe the network dynamics. When ul[t] = 1, vehicles of link l flow
to its downstream links Ldownl . Let βlk be the ratio of vehicles turning into link
k ∈ Ldownl . The following relation holds for the turning ratios:
(5)
∑
k∈Ldownl
βlk ≤ 1,
where the inequality indicates that some vehicles may flow out of the network. The
capacity available at link l to its upstream links at time t is xcapl −xl[t]. Let αu[t]il be
the capacity portion of link l available to link i ∈ Lupl when the decision on traffic
lights is u[t]. The following relation holds for the capacity ratios:
(6)
∑
i∈Lupl
α
u[t]
il = 1.
For simple intersections, it is reasonable to assume α
u[t]
il is constant if ui[t] = 1 and
zero otherwise. Therefore, for simplicity, we drop out the “u[t]” superscripts from
the capacity ratios in the rest of the paper. The number of vehicles flowing out of
link l at time step t is given by the following equation:
(7) fl[t] = ul[t] min
{
xl[t], cl, min
k∈Ldownl
αlk
βlk
(xcapk − xk[t])
}
,
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where cl is the maximum number of vehicles that can flow out of link l in one time
step. The one-step evolution of link xl is given by:
xl[t+ 1] = Fl(xlocall [t], u[t], dl[t])
= min
xl[t]− fl[t] + ∑
i∈Lupl
βilfi[t] + dl[t], x
cap
l
 ,(8)
where xlocall = {xm} ,m =
{
l ∪ Llocall
}
and dl[t] is the number of vehicles arriving
in the link l from outside of the network at time t. We also denote d[t] = {dl}l∈L ∈
D ⊂ Rn, where D is assumed to be a known set. We observe that Fl is a piecewise
affine function. The network dynamics is written in the following compact form:
(9) x[t+ 1] = F (x[t], d[t], u[t]) ,
where F : X ×D × U → X is a piecewise affine function.
3. Problem Formulation and Approach
In this section we formulate the problem and briefly explain the approach. First,
we define the safety set as a union of hyper-rectangles in the state space X . A hyper-
rectangle H ⊂ X is defined with respect to a set of rectangular inequalities in the
form of:
(10) H := {x ∈ X | xli ≤ ri} , i = 1, · · · , p
where ri ∈ (0, xcapli ) and p ≤ n. A safe set S is defined as a union of hyper-
rectangles:
(11) S :=
⋃
s
Hs, s = 1, · · · , nS ,
where each Hs is a hyper-rectangle in the form of (10). Note that the safe set is,
in general, non-convex. Considering constraints of the form xl ≤ rl stems from the
practical purpose that the safe set should always favor fewer number of vehicles on
each link. For easier readability and expressivity, we can describe S as the set of
values x ∈ X that satisfy a boolean expression over a set of rectangular constraints
that are connected with boolean operators ∧ (conjunction) and ∨ (disjunction).
For example, we may express S as state values that satisfy the boolean expression
((x1 ≤ r1) ∨ (x2 ≤ r2))∧(x3 ≤ r3). The conversion of a set defined by a boolean ex-
pression to the hyper-rectangle form of (11) is straightforward and is not discussed
in this paper.
Remark 1. We can extend the notion of safe set for the instantaneous state into
the time evolution of the state. For example, we may desire that if xl[t] > rl,
then xl[t + 1] ≤ rl. This specification can be captured by the boolean expression
(xl[t] ≤ rl)∨ (xl[t+1] ≤ rl), which is over the state space X ×X . In a more concise
way, we are able to construct safe sets in higher dimensions from time bounded
temporal logic specifications such as signal temporal logic (STL) and bounded linear
temporal logic (BLTL).
The network model (9) is a piecewise affine system controlled by discrete inputs
(traffic lights) where exogenous values for d are considered as adversarial inputs.
The safety problem considered in this paper is finding a control strategy such that
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for all allowable realizations of adverserial inputs, the evolution of the system re-
mains in the safe set. On the other hand, the controls that ensure safety are often
not unique. For practical implementation, (sub)optimal selection of the controls
subject to an appropriate cost function is also important. Since the system is
complex and various constraints are present, we use MPC strategy to the find the
optimal control sequence over a finite horizon. Once an optimal control sequence
is found, only the current step control is applied to the system and given the new
measurements at next time step, a new optimal control sequence is found accord-
ingly. The finite horizon cost criterion considered in this paper is the total time
spent (TTS) of the network, which is used extensively in traffic literature. It can
be shown that finite horizon TTS is equivalent to the total number of vehicles [19]:
J :=
t+H∑
τ=t+1
∑
l∈L
xl[τ ],
where H is the length of the prediction horizon. The finite horizon control sequence
starting at time t is:
uH [t] := {u[t], u[t+ 1], · · · , u[t+H − 1]} .
Given the finite horizon exogenous input sequence {d[t], · · · , d[t+H − 1]} and the
current system state x[t], one can compute, using (9), the finite horizon evolution of
the system {x[t+ 1], · · · , x[t+H]}. Since the values of d are in general unknown, it
is impossible to precisely predict the finite horizon cost function. In this paper, we
simply replace the values of d with estimated, or nominal, values de[t] and predict
the cost function with the resulting estimated state values xe[t]. The values of
de[t] are assumed to be given by some means like online measurements from remote
sensing available in a modern urban setting. We also assume that the current state
x[t] is known, however, this assumption is not totally restrict as discussed later
in the paper. Note that optimizing the estimated, or nominal, cost is often an
appropriate approach in robust MPC as other approaches such as optimization of
the worst case cost are usually computationally intensive and often result in poor
performance [2]. Notice that the estimated values for adversarial inputs are only
used to predict the finite horizon cost whereas the safety property is guaranteed
with respect to the all allowable adversarial inputs.
Problem 1. Given an urban traffic network (9) and a safety set S in the form of
(11), find a control strategy that for all allowable sequences of adversarial inputs
d[t] ∈ D, the evolution of the system is guaranteed to remain in the safe set:
(12) x[t] ∈ S,∀t ∈ Z≥0,
and, optimize an estimated (nominal) finite horizon cost function:
(13) Je =
t+H∑
τ=t+1
∑
l∈L
xel [τ ],
where xe are given by the estimated (nominal) finite horizon evolution of the system.
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The MPC optimization problem that includes safety only over the finite horizon
is:
(14)
uH [t] = argmin
t+H∑
τ=t+1
∑
l∈L
xel [τ ]
s.t x[τ ] ∈ S,
x[τ + 1] = F(x[τ ], d[τ ], u[τ ]),
xe[τ + 1] = F(x[τ ], de[τ ], u[τ ]),
∀d[τ ] ∈ D, τ = t, ... , t+H − 1.
However, finite horizon safety does not guarantee infinite horizon safety. In other
words, it is possible that the MPC optimization problem becomes infeasible at some
time. The key contribution of this paper is guaranteeing recursive feasibility, which
is defined as follows.
Definition 1. An MPC problem is recursively feasible if the application of control
u[t] from the solution of the MPC optimization problem at time t guarantees the
feasibility of the MPC optimization problem at time t+ 1.
A well known method to guarantee recursive feasibility is adding an appropriate
terminal constraint [14] to the MPC problem in the form of:
(15) x[t+H] ∈ T ,
where T ⊆ S is the terminal set. Our approach to Problem 1 involves solutions to
the two following subproblems.
Subproblem 1. (Terminal Set) Find a terminal set T such that adding the ter-
minal constraint (15) to the MPC optimization problem (14) guarantees recursive
feasibility.
Subproblem 2. (MPC) Find u[t] by solving the optimization problem (14) with
the addition of the terminal constraint (15).
Subproblem 1 is solved once and in offline fashion, while Subproblem 2 is solved
online at each time step. It is also reasonable to assume that in the online imple-
mentation, more precise knowledge of values of d are available for a finite horizon.
However once solving Subproblem 1, the whole set of D is taken into account. Our
approach to Subproblem 1 concerns computing a robust controlled invariant set
inside S that involves abstracting the system into a finite state transition system,
which is explained in detail in Section 4. Our solution to Subproblem 2 is based on
formulating the problem as a MILP problem that is solvable using efficient com-
mercial solvers such as Gurobi and CPLEX. The translation of dynamical and set
constraints to MILP is explained in Section 5.
4. Terminal Set and Invariance
This section focuses on the solution to Subproblem 1. First, we define the notion
of robust controlled invariant set. Next, we provide a summary on how to abstract
system (9) to a finite state transition system. We then state, and prove, that the
properties of the abstract system can be used to find a solution to Subproblem 1.
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4.1. Robust Controlled Invariant Set.
Definition 2. [5] Given the discrete time uncertain control system:
(16) zk+1 = f(zk, vk, wk),
where zk ∈ Z is the state, vk ∈ V is the control and wk ∈ W is the disturbance or
adversarial input, the set C ⊆ Z is robust controlled invariant if and only if:
(17) ∀zk ∈ C ∃vk ∈ V s.t. f(zk, vk, wk) ∈ C ∀wk ∈ W.
It can be shown that the union of robust control invariant sets is itself robust
control invariant. It also can be shown that if there exists a robust control invariant
set, then there exists a unique maximal robust controlled invariant set (MRCIS)
which is the union of all possible robust control invariant sets [14].
Definition 3. [14] Given a control system (16) and a set G, the robust one step
set (robust predecessor) Ω(G) is defined as:
(18) Ω(G) = {zk ∈ Z | ∃vk ∈ V s.t. f(zk, vk, wk) ∈ G ∀wk ∈ W}.
We wish to find the robust controlled invariant set of the traffic network inside
the safe set S. The traffic network’s MRCIS inside S, which is denoted by I, can be
computed using the well known Algorithm 1[14]. The main drawback of this algo-
rithm is that finite termination is not guaranteed. Furthermore, early termination
results in an over-approximation of MRCIS which is undesirable. Even if MRCIS
is determined in finitely many steps, performing the operations in Algorithm 1 for
dynamics (9), which is piecewise affine with adversarial inputs, and a non-convex
safe set S, is computationally intractable due to the severe limitations in performing
polyhedral operations like Pontryagin’s difference [14] for a non-convex set. Our
approach to overcome these issues is to abstract the system as a finite state transi-
tion system. In the finite realm, implementation of Algorithm 1 is much easier and
finite termination is assured.
Algorithm 1 Procedure for MRCIS I inside S
I0 = S
while Ii 6= Ii+1 do
Ii+1 = Ω(Ii) ∩ Ii
end while
return I = Ii
4.2. Finite State Abstraction.
Definition 4. (Finite State Transition System) A (non-determistic) finite state
transition system is defined as the tuple FT S = (Q,Σ, δ,Λ, λ) where Q is a finite
set of states, Σ is a finite set of symbols (controls), δ : Q×Σ→ 2Q is the transition
function, Λ is a finite set of labels and λ : Q→ Λ is a labeling function.
Constructing a finite state transition system FT S = (Q,Σ, δ,Λ, λ) from the
original system (9) is treated in [8, 9] and the details are not presented in this
section. Instead, we summarize the main points about the properties of the abstract
system and provide the necessary notation for the remaining of the paper.
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Abstraction involves partitioning the state space into a finite set of hyper-
rectangles denoted by Q. The state space corresponding to each link l ∈ L, [0, xcapl ],
is partitioned into Nl intervals:
(19)
{
[0, x
(1)
l ], (x
(2)
l , x
(3)
l ], · · · , (x(Nl−1l , xcap)l ]
}
.
By performing the cartesian product of the sets from (19) for all different l ∈ L,
|Q| = ∏l∈LNl hyper-rectangles are obtained. 1 Each abstract state q ∈ Q uniquely
represents a hyper-rectangle, denoted by P(q), where the function P : Q → 2X is
defined to map each abstract state into its hyper-rectangle representation inside X .
Note that these sets provide a partition of X :⋃
q∈Q
P(q) = X , P(qa) ∩ P(qb) = ∅, qa 6= qb.
The labeling function Λ is defined with respect to the safe set S. Each q ∈ Q is
labeled as safe if the whole hyper-rectangle is inside S and unsafe otherwise. Let
QS ⊂ Q represent the set of states that are labeled safe. If the intervals (19) are
initialized with respect to S, it can be shown that:
(20) S =
⋃
q∈QS
P(q).
In other words, no q ∈ Q represents a hyper-rectangle that is only partially in the
safe set.
The transitions are determined using dynamics (9). Since the set of controls is
finite, we let Σ = U . For each abstract state q ∈ Q and control u ∈ U , the set
of one-step reachable abstract states, denoted by post(q, u), is computed by taking
into account all allowable adversarial inputs:
(21)
q′ ∈ post(q, u) if and only if
∃x ∈ P(q),∃d ∈ D s.t. F(x, u, d) ∈ P(q′).
The set post(q, u) often includes more than one state which results in non-determinism
in the finite state transition system. The computation of post operation for a piece-
wise affine system with exogenous inputs requires intensive polyhedral operations.
On the other hand, based on the sparsity and component-wise monotonicity prop-
erties of the traffic networks, authors in [9, 8] have introduced a computationally
efficient method that, under some mild assumptions, slightly over-approximates
post(q, u) by the set post(q, u), post(q, u) ⊆ post(q, u). Finally, all transition rela-
tions δ(q, u) =
{
q′ | q′ ∈ post(q, u)} are constructed and the finite state abstraction
procedure is completed.
Proposition 1. The abstarct finite system simulates the original system, i.e. any
transition in the original system is captured by at least one transition in the abstract
system:
(22)
∀x ∈ X ∀u ∈ U ∀d ∈ D s.t. x′ = F(x, u, d),
∃q, q′ ∈ Q, x ∈ P(q), x′ ∈ P(q′) s.t. q′ ∈ δ(q, u).
Proof. See [9]. 
1We abuse the notation and call these sets hyper-rectangles even though not all of them contain
their boundaries (see (10)).
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Note that the simulation property does not state that all trajectories in the
abstract system are also present in the original system. In fact, the finite state
transition system may include spurious trajectories that are not present in the
original system. Although the presence of these transitions do not affect safety
control, they introduce conservatism in optimal planning.
4.3. MRCIS for the Abstract System. In this section, we find the abstract
system’s MRCIS, denoted by QI , in the safe set QS . The analogous of Algorithm 1
for the MRCIS of a finite system is also known as the “safety game” [22], which is
based on iteratively removing the states that are absorbed into the unsafe set for all
controls. The procedure is outlined in Algorithm 2. We define the hyper-rectangle
Algorithm 2 Procedure for MRCIS QI inside QS
1: QI = QS
2: while Qa 6= ∅ do
3: Qa = ∅
4: for q ∈ QI do
5: if ∀u ∈ U δ(q, u) 6⊆ QI then
6: Qa ← Qa ∪ q
7: end if
8: end for
9: QI ← QI \Qa
10: end while
11: return QI
representation of QI as
(23) I˜ :=
⋃
q∈QI
P(q).
Since QI ⊆ QS , it is clear that I˜ ⊆ S.
Theorem 1. I˜ is a robust controlled invariant set of the original system (9).
Proof. (proof by contradiction) Suppose that I˜ is not a robust controlled invariant
set. Then
∃x ∈ I˜ s.t. ∀u ∈ U ∃d ∈ D s.t. x′ = F(x, u, d) 6∈ I.
In words, there exists a state x such that for all available controls, there exist an
exogenous input that the next step state value x′ is outside of the set I˜. Let q
and q′ be the abstract states that x ∈ P(q), x′ ∈ P(q′). The above expression is
equivalent to:
∃q ∈ QI s.t. ∃x ∈ P(q) s.t. ∀u ∈ U ∃d ∈ D
s.t. ∃q′ 6∈ QI s.t. ∃x′ ∈ P(q′), x′ = F(x, u, d).
We claim that q′ ∈ δ(q, u). If q′ 6∈ δ(q, u), then there exists a state x ∈ P(q) such
that ∃u ∈ U ,∃d ∈ D that x′ = F(x, u, d) and x′ ∈ P(q′) where q′ 6∈ δ(q, u), which
violates the simulation property (Proposition 1). Therefore, q′ ∈ δ(q, u) hence
∃q ∈ QI s.t. ∀u ∈ U ∃q′ 6∈ QI s.t. q′ ∈ δ(q, u),
which is equivalent to
∃q ∈ QI s.t. ∀u ∈ U δ(q, u) 6⊆ QI ,
10 SADRA SADRADDINI AND CALIN BELTA
that is in contradiction with lines 5 to 9 of Algorithm 2 that states such an abstract
state is removed from QI . Therefore, I˜ is a robust controlled invariant set. 
Corollary 1. The abstract system’s MRCIS is a subset of the original system’s
MRCIS. i.e. I˜ ⊆ I.
Proof. Since I is a the maximum robust controlled invariant set and unique, I˜ ⊆
I. 
4.4. Recursive Feasibility. Now we prove that replacing the terminal set with a
robust controlled invariant set guarantees recursive feasibility.
Theorem 2. The following MPC optimization problem:
(24)
uH,opt[t] = argmin
t+H∑
τ=t+1
∑
l∈L
xel [τ ]
s.t x[τ ] ∈ S,
x[t+H] ∈ I˜,
x[τ + 1] = F(x[τ ], d[τ ], u[τ ]),
xe[τ + 1] = F(x[τ ], de[τ ], u[τ ]),
∀d[τ ] ∈ D, τ = t, ... , t+H − 1.
is recursively feasible.
Proof. Suppose that the solution to the optimization problem above is found as
uH,opt[t] = {ut[t], ut[t+ 1], · · · , ut[t+H − 1]}, where ut[t] is applied to the system.
We need to prove that the feasible set of the optimization problem of uH [t + 1] is
nonempty. It is known from the optimization problem of uH [t] that applying the rest
of the open-loop sequence {ut[t+ 1], ut[t+ 2] · · · , ut[t+H − 1]} will result x[t+H]
to be inside I˜. Since I˜ is a robust controlled invariant set, for any x[t + H] ∈ I˜
there exists at least at least one control u˜ that guarantees F(x[t+H], u˜, d) ∈ I˜ ∀d ∈
D. Therefore, uH [t + 1] = {ut[t+ 1], ut[t+ 2] · · · , ut[t+H − 1], u˜} satisfies the
constraints of optimization problem of uH [t+ 1] which hence guarantees recursive
feasibility. 
Finally, we have found a solution to Problem 1 and we let the terminal constraint
to be:
(25) T = I˜.
4.5. Discussions. Algorithm 2 may end with an empty set which, unfortunately,
does not conclude that I is also empty. In this case, finer partitions are required
to find a nonempty invariant set. Furthermore, refinement may also enlarge I˜ if it
is already nonempty, which leads to less conservative hence more control options.
Note that the refinement of partitions outside QS is not necessary. However, the
number of partitions and transitions in the abstract system grows exponentially
with respect to the network size. Therefore, our approach to safety control is
restricted to small networks.
We need to also address an important issue regarding initial feasibility of the
MPC optimization problem. Since the controls are open-loop, no initially feasible
problem for large horizons may exist. In the most extreme case, an initially feasi-
ble optimization problem may be only available for H = 1 (where the trajectories
should always remain in the invariant set I˜). Otherwise, if the initial MPC opti-
mization problem is infeasible, for instance x is initially outside S, one can solve
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the “reachability” game [22] to guide the state of the system into I˜ and later start
implementing the MPC. It is worth to note that the reachability game may also be
infeasible from some initial conditions.
5. Model Predictive Control
In this section, we provide the solution to Subproblem 2 based on MILP for-
mulation of the optimization problem (24). We also discuss the limitations of the
MILP approach.
5.1. Mixed Logical Representations of Traffic Networks. The traffic net-
work dynamics (9) is a hybrid system that falls into the class of mixed logical
dynamical (MLD) systems which can be encoded using mixed integer constraints
[3]. Formally, we have:
Proposition 2. The traffic dynamics (9) can be formulated as a finite set of mixed
integer constraints:
(26)
x[t+ 1] = F (x[t], d[t], u[t])
⇔ x[t+ 1] + Exx[t] + Euu[t] + Edd[t] + Ezz[t] + Eδδ[t] ≤ e,
where z[t] is the vector of auxiliary continuous variables, δ[t] is the vector of auxil-
iary binary variables, Ex, Eu, Ed, Ez, Eδ are appropriately defined constant ma-
trices and e is a vector that is defined such that the set of mixed-integer constraints
is well posed, i.e. for given values of x[t], u[t] and d[t], the feasible set of x[t + 1]
is a single point.
Proof. The proof is constructive. We define the auxiliary continuous variables
zl[t], l ∈ L:
(27) zl[t] := min
{
xl[t], cl, min
k∈Ldownl
αlk
βlk
(xcapk − xk[t])
}
.
Eqn. (7) is written as:
(28) fl[t] = ul[t]zl[t],
where the integer constraints encoding zl[t] are:
(29)

zl[t] ≤ xl[t], zl[t] ≥ xl[t]−Mδl,1,
zl[t] ≥ ck −Mδl,2, zl[t] ≤ cl,
zl[t] ≤ αlkβlk (x
cap
l − xl[t]),∀k ∈ Ldownl ,
zl[t] ≥ αlkβlk (x
cap
l − xl[t])−Mδl,k,∀k ∈ Ldownl ,
δl,i ∈ {0, 1},
δl,1 + δl,2 +
∑
k∈Ldownl
δl,k = 2 +
∣∣Ldownk ∣∣ ,
where M is a sufficiently large constant such that
M ≥ αkl
βkl
xcapl ∀l ∈ L, k ∈ Ldownl ,
and δl,i’s are auxiliary binary variables. The relations above ensure that the flow
satisfies the min argument in (7). Next, relation (28) is encoded as:
(30)
 fl[t] ≤ clul[t], fl[t] ≥ 0,fl[t] ≤ zl[t], fl[t] ≥ zl[t]− clul[t],
ul[t] ∈ {0, 1} ,
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where cl ≥ zl[t] is enforced in (29). We also define
(31) z′l[t] := xl[t]− fl[t] +
∑
i∈Lupl
βilfi[t] + dl[t],
which is linear in terms introduced before. Finally
(32)

Fl[t] ≤ z′l[t],Fl[t] ≤ xcapl ,
Fl[t] ≥ z′l[t]−M ′δz′l ,Fl[t] ≥ xcapl −M ′(1− δz′l),
δz′ ∈ {0, 1} ,
where M ′ ≥ max
l∈L
xcapl is a sufficiently large constant. Since U is also encoded
by integer constraints (as explained in Sec. 2), all the dynamical constraints can
be described as mixed integer constraints that in a compact form are written as
(26). 
5.2. Robust MPC. A solution to the MPC optimization problem requires that
the safety and terminal constraints are satisfied for all allowable adversarial inputs
d ∈ D. In this section, we briefly explain how to characterize the H-step reachable
sets.
5.2.1. One-step reachable set. We assume the set D is given as a union of hyper-
rectangles:
(33) D =
⋃
id=1
Did , id = 1, · · · , nD,
such that each Did is a hyper-rectangle in the form of
{
d | did ≤ d ≤ did
}
, where
the inequalities are interpreted element-wise. Note that this assumption is not re-
strictive as one may over-approximate any bounded set by hyper-rectangles. Given
control u[τ ], we wish to compute the one-step reachable set of hyper-rectangle∏
l∈L [xl[τ ], xl[τ ]].
Assumption 1. For all l ∈ L, i ∈ Lupl , the following inequality holds:
(34) xcapl ≥ cl + ci
βil
αil
.
The assumption above is satisfied if the maximum flow rates are small enough,
which is physically accomplished when the length of the discrete time steps are
small. It is shown in [9] that, under Assumption 1, an increase in xl[t] leads to an
increase in xl[t+ 1]. Furthermore, xl[t+ 1] is monotonically increasing (decreasing)
with respect to the number of vehicles on its downstream and upstream (adjacent)
links. Using this component-wise monotonicity property, we have:
(35)
xidl [τ + 1] = max
{
xidl [τ ]− ul[τ ] min
{
xidl [τ ], cl, min
l∈Ldownk
αlk
βlk
(xcapk − xidk [τ ])
}
+
∑
i∈Lupk
βilui[τ ] min
{
xidi [τ ], ci,
αil
βil
(xcapl − xidl [τ ]),
min
j∈Ladjl
αij
βij
(xcapj − xidj [τ ])
}
+ d
id
l [τ ], x
cap
l
}
,
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(36)
xidl [τ + 1] = max
{
xidl [τ ]− ul[τ ] min
{
xidl [τ ], cl, min
l∈Ldownk
αlk
βlk
(xcapk − xidk [τ ])
}
+∑
i∈Lupk
βilui[τ ] min
{
xidi [τ ], ci,
αil
βil
(xcapl − xidl [τ ]),
min
j∈Ladjl
αij
βij
(xcapj − xidj [τ ])
}
+ didl [τ ], x
cap
l
}
,
where lower (over) bars stand for lower (upper) bounds of the values x and d,
and superscript id stands for the values obtained from exogenous inputs in hyper-
rectangle Did . We denote:
(37) Rid([x[τ ], x[τ ]] , u[τ ]) =
∏
l∈L
[
xidl [τ + 1], x
id
l [τ + 1]
]
.
The one step reachable set is thus given by an union of hyper-rectangles:
(38) R(1)(x[τ ], x[τ ], u[τ ]) =
nD⋃
id=1
Rid([x[τ ], x[τ ]] , u[τ ]).
5.2.2. H-step reachable set. Using (38), the H-step reachable is given by:
(39)
R(H)([x[t], x[t]], uH [t]) =
nD⋃
iH
d
=1
...
nD⋃
i1
d
=1
RiH
d
([
...
[
Ri1
d
([x[t], x[t]] , u[t])
]
...
]
, u[t+H − 1]
)
,
where x[t] = x[t]. Note that we may assume bounded uncertainties in online
measurements of x[t] but this may cause issues with recursive feasibility guarantee
for the MPC problem 2. The number of mixed logical equations in the form of
(26) required to encode the H-step reachable set is 2nHD (one for each set of (35),
(36)). The MILP problem becomes quickly intractable if nD > 1. Therefore, MILP
implementation requires D to be given by a single hyper-rectangle.
Remark 2. The network dynamics is monotonic if no link in the model has an
adjacent link. Many models for single arterials with side streets fall into this cat-
egory. In this case, only the upper bounds xl and d are required to compute the
H-step evolution, which significantly reduces the MILP size.
5.3. Non-Convex Sets and Additional Integer Constraints. The constraints
corresponding to the safe set S and terminal set T also can be encoded as mixed
integer constraints. We do not explain this method as encoding non-convex sets
using integer constraints is a well known straightforward procedure [4]. The main
issue is that the number of integer constraints describing the sets can be very large,
and hence the MILP formulation becomes impractical. One approach to overcome
this issue is considering the set constraints as lazy constraints [11], i.e. adding them
to the MILP problem if they are violated by the relaxed solution. However, this
approach may still require incorporating all the constraints.
2In short, uncertainty in x[t] can be considered up to a level that the current abstract state q,
which x[t] ∈ P(q), can be uniquely determined.
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5.4. Discussions. The computational complexity of MILPs grow exponentially
with respect to the number of integer constraints. Therefore, practical implemen-
tation of MILP in our framework is restricted to simple problems.
Since the set of controls is finite, a much simpler approach is full enumeration
of the all controls over H-step horizon. This approach is computationally tractable
if the size of U and the horizon H are small, which is the case in small networks.
Using full enumeration, we may consider arbitrarily complex safe sets.
6. Example
We implemented our methods on a simple urban traffic network. The results are
presented in this section. Consider a network with 9 links and 3 intersections, as
illustrated in Fig. 2. The parameters of the model are given as
xcap1 = x
cap
2 = x
cap
3 = x
cap
4 = x
cap
5 = x
cap
6 = 55,
xcap8 = x
cap
9 = 40, c7 = c7 = c9 = 15
c1 = c2 = c2 = c4 = c5 = c6 = 20,
β12 = β23 = β45 = β56 = 0.7, β72 = 0.5,
β86 = β83 = 0.4, β95 = 0.3,
and all capacity ratios are one. The safety set is given by the boolean expression
φ1 ∧ φ2 ∧ φ3 ∧ φ4, where
φ1 = (x1 ≤ 36) ∧ (x4 ≤ 36),
φ2 = (x2 ≤ 44) ∨ (x3 ≤ 44),
φ3 = (x5 ≤ 44) ∨ (x6 ≤ 44),
φ4 = (x7 ≤ 32) ∨ (x8 ≤ 32) ∨ (x9 ≤ 32).
In plain English, φ1 requires that the entry arterials 1, 4 are never congested, φ2
and φ3 state that if the traffic on a link in the mid-corridor is heavy, the other is
light. φ4 prevents the entry side links 7, 8, 9 from being congested simultaneously.
We assume that each intersection has two modes of controls corresponding to the
horizontal and vertical flows, |U| = 23 = 8. The set characterizing exogenous inputs
(arrival rates) is D = {d | 0 ≤ d ≤ (15, 0, 0, 15, 0, 0, 10, 10, 10)T}.
We abstract the states corresponding to the links 1, 4, 7, 8, 9 to 3 intervals and
the states of the remaining links into 2, generating 3888 abstract states, where 1664
of them represent the safe hyper-rectangles. Computing the finite state transition
system took 434 seconds on a 3 GHz dual core Macbook Pro. Solving the safety
game took 31 seconds and the finite state transition system’s MRCIS, QI , consists
of 1176 abstract states.
We solved the robust MPC with horizon H = 3 relying on full enumeration of the
controls. We used (39) to find 3-step reachable set and checked the safety and the
terminal constraint for all the reachable set. We didn’t use MILP as the number of
constraints required to encode the safe and terminal sets are very large. However,
we plan to investigate the problem of (approximately) encoding the set constraints
using minimal number of constraints in future. Fig. 3 b) shows the robustness
of the trajectory obtained from the MPC solution simulated for 20 time steps.
The robustness is computed by measuring the minimum Euclidian distance of the
system’s state to the safety set’s boundaries 3. The exogenous inputs were randomly
3The robustness defined in this section is inspired by the definition of STL robustness (see
[16]).
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Figure 2. The urban traffic network studied in this example
a) b)
Figure 3. a) The number of vehicles on each link b) robustness
ρ measures the distance to the safety set boundaries. Notice that
robustness is always above zero since the trajecory is always in the
safe set.
chosen from D with uniform distribution. The values of estimated exogenous inputs
for optimal planning were also randomly chosen.
7. Future Work
Our future work involves determining safe sets using learning methods. Using
real world traffic data, we will characterize the trajectories that result in undesirable
behavior. Therefore, safe sets considered in this paper will not be user-defined but
generated from real data. By combining learning techniques, formal methods and
control theory, we will improve current measures of intelligent traffic management.
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